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# Transatlantic Trends: Leaders



TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

KEY FINDINGS 2011

# Transatlantic Trends: Leaders 2011 Partners

**G | M | F** The German Marshall Fund  
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**STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION**



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## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Introduction*

This report presents the first systematic survey of the views of leaders in the European Union and the United States on the state, nature, and challenges of transatlantic relations. This study stems from the experience of *Transatlantic Trends*, which has surveyed the general public in Europe and the United States since 2002, and of the *European Elite Survey*, which has surveyed Members of the European Parliament and top-level officials of the Commission and the Council since 2006. This year, for the first time, this survey included American leaders as well in order to offer a systematic comparative analysis of the views of European and American leaders, and to allow for a comparison with the views of the public, as gauged by the 2010 *Transatlantic Trends* survey.

Leadership surveys on foreign and security issues have been conducted before, both in Europe and the United States. However, this is the first time, since the 1960s, in which leaders *and* the public on *both* sides of the Atlantic have been surveyed, using the same questions. This project is supported by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, and it constitutes a further step in a more systematic understanding of the transatlantic relations, and the undercurrent attitudinal similarities and differences among Europeans and Americans.

Defining and operationalizing the opinion leaders who are most relevant in the transatlantic dialogue was not an easy task. The authors of this report decided to survey people in Brussels and Washington, DC, from a wide variety of backgrounds — largely falling into the categories of political, administrative, social, and economic leaders. As for politicians, senior-level Congressional staff and senior-level office-holders in the executive branch were

interviewed in the United States, while in Europe, members of the European parliament from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom, as well as high-level officials of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union were included in the sample. With regard to economic leaders, representatives of businesses and labor unions were interviewed. Moreover, the sample also included a segment containing journalists, key staff from nongovernmental groups such as think tanks, trade associations, and nongovernmental organizations such as the World Bank.

The survey's findings are based on a total of 519 interviews of transatlantic opinion leaders, 286 in Washington, DC, and 233 in Brussels. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International in the United States and by TNS Opinion in Europe. In both the United States and Europe, data were collected via telephone and via online administration. The fieldwork in the United States took place between June 17-September 13, 2010, and from June 21-October 1, 2010, in Europe.

The results of this survey are compared to the findings of *Transatlantic Trends 2010*. *Transatlantic Trends* is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted by TNS Opinion between June 1 and June 29, 2010, in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom with a sample size of approximately 1,000 respondents per country. The *Transatlantic Trends* survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from

the Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Communitas Foundation.

The following chapters present the key findings from the survey. For results based on the national samples of the general public in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition to sampling errors, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls. For the full topline dataset, detailed methodology, and other related materials, please refer to [www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org).

The survey revealed some striking similarities and differences in opinion between leaders and the public on each side of the Atlantic. Among others, the key findings were:

- U.S. and EU leaders were more likely than their respective publics to say that the relationship between the United States and EU is good.
- EU leaders were more than twice as likely as the public to have a *very* favorable opinion of the United States.
- EU and U.S. leaders were much more likely to say that the United States and EU have common values than were the publics on either side of the Atlantic.
- EU leaders are much more likely to favor strong U.S. leadership in world affairs than was the EU public.
- EU leaders were less approving of President Obama's efforts to fight climate change than was the EU public.
- U.S. leaders were more likely to say that working to ease the tensions in the Middle East should be a priority than was the U.S. public, and EU leaders were less concerned about terrorism and more concerned about the economy than the EU public.
- U.S. leaders were just as pessimistic about stabilizing Afghanistan as their EU counterparts and, of all the groups, only the U.S. public was somewhat optimistic.
- The public and leaders shared common concerns about a nuclear Iran, but leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were less likely than the public to approve of military action if all other options failed to prevent a nuclear Iran.
- Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were more likely to see China as an economic opportunity than were their respective publics.
- There was very strong U.S. support for Turkey joining the EU, and U.S. leaders were the most likely of all to say Turkey joining the EU would be a good thing.
- The EU public said it would not be good thing if Turkey joined the EU but said it is likely to happen. Meanwhile, EU leaders said Turkey should join the EU but it is unlikely to happen.
- EU leaders were much more likely to say that the EU should have the primary responsibility for dealing with the current economic crisis than was the EU public.



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Transatlantic Relations in the Obama Era*

The general state of transatlantic relations appears to be very good, as seen from the perspective of both leaders and their public. While specific issues were met with varying levels of agreement or disagreement, transatlantic leaders and their respective publics showed positive attitudes toward each other and could generally agree that the state of the transatlantic relationship was good. Below are some of the key findings on this topic:


#### **STRONG SUPPORT FOR EU AND U.S. LEADERSHIP**



Majorities in all groups surveyed found it desirable that the EU and the United States exert strong leadership in world affairs. EU leaders and the public, in Europe and the United

States, support a strong U.S. and European leadership in world affairs (see charts 1 and 2).

While U.S. leaders (96%) and the U.S. public (84%) overwhelmingly supported U.S. leadership in world affairs and EU leaders (85%) reflected the same level of support for U.S. leadership, the EU public (54%) remained less convinced that strong U.S. leadership is desirable.

The public, in both Europe and the United States, was slightly less supportive of strong U.S. and EU leadership than the leaders. While 93% of the American leaders and 92% of the European leaders favored a strong EU leader-





ship, fewer Americans (82%) and EU citizens (76%) thought the same.

Over time, EU public support for strong U.S. leadership has bounced back to levels of the early 2000s, but these levels are still much lower than support among both ministers of the European Parliament (MEPs) and top-level officials.

When asked about the likelihood of future leadership, a majority of both leaders and the general public in the United States and EU were convinced that the EU and the United States will exert strong leadership five years from now. However, all groups were slightly more prone to say that the United States will exert strong leadership than they were to say the same about the EU (see charts 1 and 2).

Just as the EU public was less likely to think that the United States will exert strong leadership, they were also less likely to think that the EU would do the same. While EU leaders (84%), U.S. leaders (87%), and the U.S. public (84%) predicted the EU would exert strong leadership in


the future, slightly less of the European public (75%) was convinced.


Chart 1 shows that while the EU public is divided about the desirability of U.S. leadership in world affairs, Europeans were realistic enough to see that it is likely the United States will exert strong leadership in the future. Specifically, 55% of the European public favored strong U.S. leadership, and 80% thought the United States will likely exert strong leadership five years from now.

### EU-U.S. RELATIONS STRONG

Leaders in the United States and Europe were more likely than the public to say relations between EU and United States are good. While 76% of the American leaders and 73% of the European leaders said so, only 54% of the American public and 58% of the EU public thought so.

Both leaders and the public had strongly positive attitudes toward the other side of the Atlantic. The leaders were always more favorable than the public to both the United States and the EU. Ninety-three percent of the EU leaders






had positive feelings toward the United States and 91% of the American leaders felt the same toward the EU. Among the general public, 76% of the Europeans had a positive attitude toward the United States and 68% of the American public felt likewise toward the EU.

Among the European public, sentiments toward the United States were more positive than the desire for a strong U.S. leadership, but this desire did not obfuscate their assessment about the future short term role of U.S. leadership (see chart 6).


Although the majority in both the United States and Europe thought that relations between United States and the EU have either improved or stayed the same, over one-third of the American public (35%) thought that relations have gotten worse, as opposed to 14% of the American leaders.

#### COMMON VALUES


Both leaders and the public, in Europe and the United States, thought that the United States and EU have enough





**Chart 7:  
U.S.-EU Relations Over the Past Year**



**Chart 8:  
The U.S.-EU Partnership Should Be...**





common values to cooperate, with the leaders being more likely to say so than the public.

a minority, agreed that Obama was handling climate change well. Among the European public (61%), U.S. public (55%), and U.S. leaders (61%), a majority showed their approval.

A plurality of leaders in Europe (49%) and the United States (62%) claimed the partnership between EU and United States should become closer. However, 35% of the EU leaders answered that they should be more independent, as did 38% of the EU public and 30% of the U.S. public, while only 5% of the U.S. leaders felt the same way.

**TRANSATLANTIC PRIORITY:  
THE ECONOMY AND CLIMATE CHANGE**

Both leaders and the general public stressed the management of the recent economic crisis as the first priority for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic (see table 1).

**ASSESSING OBAMA'S POLICIES**

On average, leaders and the public were more likely to approve U.S. President Barack Obama's overall handling of international issues than they were to approve of his handling of specific issue areas. However, the American public was somewhat more divided than the leaders (see chart 9).

European leaders were least satisfied with the way President Obama handled fighting climate change over the past 12 months. Only 44% of European leaders,

**Table 1  
Top Priorities for European and American Leaders**

|  | EU General Public | EU Leaders | U.S. General Public | U.S. Leaders |
|--|-------------------|------------|---------------------|--------------|
| Managing International Economic Problems | 34                | 55         | 55                  | 49           |
| Fighting Terrorism                       | 21                | 5          | 21                  | 15           |
| Fighting Climate Change                  | 21                | 18         | 5                   | 8            |
| Easing Tensions in the Middle East       | 10                | 13         | 1                   | 8            |
| Stabilizing Afghanistan                  | 6                 | 4          | 10                  | 12           |
| Managing Relations with Iran             | 3                 | 2          | 5                   | 4            |
| Managing Relations with Russia           | 1                 | 1          | 2                   | 1            |

The public, both in Europe and the United States, set fighting terrorism as a priority more frequently than their leaders, with only 5% of the EU leaders mentioning this as the top priority.

On climate change, Europeans and Americans had different priorities. More than four times as many Europeans mentioned climate change as an issue compared to Americans. While 20% of the European public and 19% of its leaders thought that climate change should be high on the policy agenda, only 5% among the U.S. general public and 8% of the U.S. leaders felt the same (see chart 10).



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Transatlantic Security Challenges*


Europeans and Americans, both leaders and the public, felt that they share enough common values with their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic to work together on international problems. However, security issues and the use of force are traditionally areas that have posed challenges for the transatlantic relationship. Below are some of the key findings on transatlantic security challenges.

#### **ECONOMIC POWER OVER MILITARY**

Strong majorities in all groups were likely to say that economic power is more important than military power in world affairs, but there was a clear transatlantic difference in opinion. Europeans, both leaders (90%) and public

(85%), were more likely to place an emphasis on economic power than their American counterparts (74% of general public and 78% of leaders). Furthermore, leaders on each side of the Atlantic were slightly more likely to agree with that statement than their respective public.

One of the longest-standing divisions in transatlantic public opinion surveys concerns the use of military force and whether, in some cases, war is necessary to obtain justice. Chart 11 demonstrates this transatlantic divide with a 48-percentage-point gap between the public on each side of the Atlantic and a 40-point gap between leaders. Leaders in both cases, however, were more likely to say that war is sometimes necessary. There was an important public-leader divide in Europe (15 points).




#### **NATO**

As the central institution of transatlantic security, NATO was seen as essential by a majority of all surveyed groups. In fact, a majority of the public (60%) on either side of the Atlantic agreed that NATO is still essential for security. The European leaders (65%) were slightly more likely to say so, and U.S. leaders (76%) overwhelmingly saw NATO as essential.

The numbers of those who thought NATO is “still essential” have remained relatively stable over time for both the U.S. and EU publics, but there was a fairly large drop (roughly 15 percentage points) over the past two years in the number of EU leaders who felt NATO is essential.

Despite feeling generally pessimistic about the prospects of stabilizing Afghanistan, both leaders and the public largely supported NATO acting outside of Europe. While Americans, both the public (78%) and leaders (80%), over-




whelmingly supported this, the European leaders (65%) and public (62%) were still also very supportive.



**AFGHANISTAN**

U.S. leaders (28%) showed equally low levels of optimism about the situation in Afghanistan as the EU leaders (16%) and the EU public (24%). Only the U.S. public (50%) was somewhat optimistic about stabilizing Afghanistan.

Optimism about Iraq was higher than it was for Afghanistan among all groups; there was a fairly clear transatlantic divide, with solid majorities of the American public and leaders positive about Iraq's future (see chart 13). However, while optimism about Iraq was significantly higher than that for Afghanistan among EU leaders (27 points), the U.S. public (10 points), and U.S. leaders (32 points), the EU public was not significantly more optimistic (4 points).

Although optimism about stabilizing Afghanistan was fairly low among all groups, pluralities of EU leaders (35%), U.S. public (32%), and U.S. leaders (41%) thought that troop





levels should remain the same — rather than increasing, reducing, or withdrawing troops. The EU public (29% maintain troop levels) was the only exception and was the group in which a plurality (45%) wanted to withdraw all troops.

When reminded about Obama’s timeline for beginning to withdraw troops in 2011, all groups except the American public showed a majority or slight plurality agreeing with this plan of action. The American public was the only group in which a plurality said that the government should not set deadlines for withdrawing troops and that troops should stay as long as necessary.


### IRAN


Overwhelming majorities of all surveyed groups were concerned with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. leaders (93%) were the most concerned, while the U.S. public (86%), EU leaders (86%), and EU public (80%) were somewhat less concerned.

When presented with various options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or the choice of just accepting this as a possibility, very small minorities (4%-6%) of any group chose to simply accept that Iran could become a nuclear state. Taking military action was similarly unpopular, with only 1-9% of any group choosing this as the best option.

Of the nonmilitary options, there was a clear transatlantic “carrot vs. stick” divide when it came to methods of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. While a plurality of the EU public (35%) and the EU leaders (48%) favored offering economic incentives to Iran, pluralities of the U.S. public (41%) and U.S. leaders (33%) preferred economic sanctions.

Although a majority in all groups surveyed preferred one of the economic options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, there was also a transatlantic divide when it came to the option of supporting opponents of the current regime. This option was favored by around one quarter of the American public (24%) and U.S. leaders





(23%), but it was less popular among the EU public (13%) and EU leaders (11%).

Those respondents who chose one of the nonmilitary options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons were then asked to imagine that all nonmilitary options had

been exhausted and they were forced to choose between military action and permitting Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. When posed this question, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic were less likely than the public to favor military action and more willing to accept a nuclear Iran (see chart 17).



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *China and Other Rising Powers from a Transatlantic Perspective*


Despite differing opinions on a number of issues, transatlantic leaders saw mostly eye-to-eye when it came to China's expected power and role in the world. In fact, in many cases, such as whether China is an economic threat or an opportunity, leaders' opinions looked more like their transatlantic counterparts than their own public. Below are some of the survey's key transatlantic views on China.


#### **CHINA EXPECTED TO EXERT STRONG WORLD LEADERSHIP**

More than India or Russia, China was very much expected to exert strong world leadership in the future.

However, the European public and their leaders were divided on the issue. While the American public (92%) and U.S. and EU leaders (92%) thought China would play a leadership role in the future, only 68% of the European public said the same.

In Europe, Russia was seen as playing a strong leadership role in the future by 52% of the public and 59% of the leaders. In the United States, 72% of the public and 65% of the leaders expected Russia to play such a role.





#### MIXED RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA


The EU public (33%) and the U.S. public (27%) were more likely than EU leaders (21%) and U.S. leaders (7%) to say relations with Russia were good — but still only a minority thought this.

The EU public (31%) was also more likely to say that relations with China were good, compared to the EU leaders (21%), U.S. public (21%), and U.S. leaders (5%).

Among both leaders and the general public, views on relations with both China and Russia were mostly seen as mixed. American and European leaders were more likely than the public to say this.

#### MIXED VIEWS ON CHINA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD

When asked about whether China plays a positive or negative role in managing global conflicts, there was a transatlantic divide, with American leaders (43%) and the American public (57%) more willing to say that China played a negative role, while only 24% of EU leaders and 32% of the EU public reported the same.



On fighting climate change, the European public (55%) was much less likely to see China as playing a negative role than were EU leaders (75%), the U.S. leaders (71%), and the U.S. public (75%) (see chart 20).

**ECONOMIC THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?**

There was a striking transatlantic divide on how China was viewed in economic terms. While solid majorities of EU leaders (63%) and U.S. leaders (66%) saw China as more of an economic opportunity, the majority of people in the EU public (51%) and the U.S. public (51%) saw China as more of an economic threat.

**CHINA NOT PERCEIVED AS MILITARY THREAT**

Leaders in the EU (70%) and the United States (60%) were more likely to say China is not a military threat than were the EU public (56%) and the U.S. public (52%).


Although the majority of people in all groups surveyed said that China was not a military threat, the U.S. public was



narrowly divided on the topic, with 48% saying it was a threat and 52% saying it was not.

**COMMON VALUES AND INTERESTS WITH CHINA?**

Only among the U.S. public (53%) did a majority of respondents feel that their country had enough common values with China to cooperate on international problems. Leaders in the United States (43%) and the EU (44%) were less confident that they shared enough common values with China to cooperate, and the EU public was the most skeptical, with only 29% believing they shared common values.

All groups were more likely to say they had enough common interests with China to work together. A majority of U.S. leaders (59%), U.S. public (59%), and EU leaders (53%) felt there were enough common interests to work together while the EU public was again the most skeptical, with only 39% saying they had common interests.







## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Turkey and the West*


Turkey's place in the world caused divisions both between Europe and the United States as well as within Europe. American leaders and their public were generally more favorably disposed toward Turkey than were Europeans. Within Europe, political leaders and their electorate were the least favorable to both Turkey in general and Turkey's membership in the EU, while top-level officials of the EU were by far the most supportive.


Deep divisions did exist among leaders and the public in both Europe and the United States about the desirability of Turkey's joining the European Union. Seventy-one percent of the U.S. leaders and 51% of the EU leaders thought Turkey joining would be a "good" thing. However, among

EU top-level officials of the Council, Commission, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU member states (COREPER), this percentage increased to 64%, while among the members of the European Parliament it decreased to 48%.

The European public was less enthusiastic about the idea of Turkey joining the EU, with only 22% thinking it would be a good thing. Of the American public, 40% thought it would be a good thing, and close to 38% of the Turks themselves thought the same (down from 73% in 2004).

Leaders and the public assessed the likelihood of Turkey becoming a member of the EU differently. Among EU






and U.S. leaders, a majority believed this to be an unlikely event, while among the public, the majority thought of it as a likely occurrence. While EU leaders were divided among themselves on whether it would be a good thing for Turkey to become a member (with top-level officials more enthusiastic than MEPs), they both shared the same pessimism about the likelihood that membership would occur.

Thirty-one percent of the European general public and 38% of the American public thought that Turkey had enough common values to cooperate with the West. Sixty percent of the Europeans (and 46% of the Americans) thought that Turkey had very different values from the West. Among the leaders, the distribution is reversed. Sixty-two percent of the European leaders and 78% of the American leaders

thought that Turkey had enough common values with the West, while only 16% of the American leaders and 35% of the European ones thought Turkey did not have enough common values.

Whatever their views on Turkey's EU membership, the majority of both American and European leaders had a favorable opinion of Turkey. Sixty percent of the EU leaders and 73% of the American leaders had favorable opinions toward Turkey. The American public was divided, with 51% having a favorable view of Turkey and 45% having a negative view. The European public was even less favorable, with only 40% of the public having a positive feeling toward Turkey and 47% having a negative one.

**Chart 26:  
Favorable Feeling Toward Turkey**






## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Euro Crisis and the EU*

**S**tark differences between European public and leaders emerged when asked whether using the euro had been a good thing or a bad thing for their country. While 85% of the leaders were positive about the introduction of the euro, only 38% of the European public responded positively.

The U.S. public felt hardest-hit by the current economic crisis, with 76% stating that they or their families had been affected within the past 12 months. This is in contrast with the U.S. leaders, of which 65% were affected, a 11-percentage-point difference. So far, Europeans seem to have gone through the crisis a little better, although majorities still felt affected. Moreover, the difference between leaders and the public in Europe was smaller than in the United States, with 52% and 61% respectively saying they had been affected in the past year.

When asked who should have the primary responsibility for dealing with the current economic crisis, a majority of the European leaders (61%) stated that this should be the responsibility of the European Union. The European public — on the other hand — was split between supporting the EU (39%) and national governments (46%) to lead their country through the crisis.





TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

*In Their Own Words*

The *Transatlantic Trends Leaders* survey had the unique opportunity to ask respondents to describe in their own words what they considered to be the most important challenge to transatlantic relations. This included the question: “In your opinion, what is the biggest challenge currently facing the transatlantic community?” It also included a follow up question: “How do you think United States and European leaders should address this challenge?”

The responses provided an insight into how transatlantic leaders think as they were not prompted to any specific

answer. This qualitative data revealed many common concerns among leaders on either side of the Atlantic, such as deep worries about the economy and a strong need for more transatlantic cooperation and understanding. In terms of depth, some of the respondents provided a single-word answer, while others included longer and more sophisticated policy recommendations. Below are some of the responses. Some responses were edited for grammar and brevity.

| Washington, DC, Leaders in Their Own Words  | Brussels Leaders in Their Own Words   |
|---|---|
| <b>Question: In your opinion, what is the biggest challenge currently facing the transatlantic community?</b>   |   |
| Economy   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The general rise of emerging economies and the relative economic stagnation of the “West.” The population of the various Western nations may want someone to “blame” and that could prove to be a very divisive force.</li> <li>• The incredible amount of debt that both we and Europe have.</li> <li>• The biggest challenges for the transatlantic community are related to the economic crisis: to retrench or continue to stimulate, bailouts of failing economies, strain on the euro. The restructuring of the EU under the Lisbon Treaty shifts the balance of power and raises questions as to who the United States is talking to as we work together to address these challenges.</li> <li>• Conflicting approaches to solving the global economic crisis — domestic compulsions hampering a drive to develop a common approach.</li> <li>• Economic stagnation and financial instability.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic deterioration leading to protectionism and social unrest both in the USA and EU.</li> <li>• Dealing with the rise and increasing influence of China, India, and Brazil.</li> <li>• Ensuring the competitiveness of the U.S. and EU economies on a level playing field with emerging powers in the global economy, managing the global economy and ending distortive policies by emerging economies such as China.</li> <li>• Decline of the transatlantic community economic and technological position.</li> </ul> |

| Washington, DC, Leaders in Their Own Words   | Brussels Leaders in Their Own Words   |
|--|---|
| <b>Cooperation</b>   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developing a consensus about how to end divisions in Europe that come down from the past and inhibit joint work on challenges to the region as a whole and inhibit effective work to address global problems.</li> <li>• Establishing a common framework for international financial regulation.</li> <li>• The lack of effective global governance capacity to address problems that nations cannot resolve alone including climate change, nuclear proliferation, genocide, and under-regulated financial institutions.</li> <li>• Its transformation from strong and independent nation-states to an international community.</li> <li>• Lack of a unifying cause to bring the transatlantic community together.</li> <li>• The failure of leadership of the United States and to a lesser extent the EU to foster responsible, sustainable economic growth; I favor more economic cooperation and the Atlantic community to compete with China and Asia. I do not want to trust the future of civilization to China.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inability to understand the importance of a common approach to face the challenges of the world agenda (economic crisis, climate change, nuclear proliferation).</li> <li>• Military cooperation, especially mustering enough support on the EU side for military actions outside the area (which will eventually have an impact on the ability and willingness to defend oneself as well).</li> <li>• The (somewhat) lack of ability on the European side to speak with one voice.</li> <li>• The key challenge is to build a renewed vision of the shared values of Europe and North America, built on a commitment to human rights and fair understanding of the basis of democracy in citizen engagement.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Culture and Demographics</b>  |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demographic/generational changes on each side of the Atlantic that view the relationship in different or maybe more disposable terms than before. Essentially younger generations have less of a memory of the relationship's importance during the Cold War, while increasing Hispanic populations in the United States may draw America's attention south, and Europe's continued struggles to integrate its Muslim minorities may draw its attention to either domestic issues or towards Middle East policy. The transatlantic relationship won't be dispensed with, but it will never be as close as it was during the Cold War.</li> <li>• Demographics — the high birth rate and lack of assimilation of the immigrant communities will in time erode the political and economic strengths of the transatlantic community.</li> <li>• Balancing the economic differences between very different societies and cultures.</li> <li>• The disparate notions of what is required and the appropriate balance of diplomacy and direct military confrontation to address the threat of radical Islamic terrorism.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A "positive" perception of one another should be a key priority (both in the EU and United States), not just in the media, but in universities, etc.</li> <li>• American ignorance of history and lack of skill in handling foreign affairs; European inability to decide and act on important matters due to a tendency to pursue lowest common denominator solutions.</li> <li>• Having a model of social justice and political freedom that is attractive to the whole world. At the moment, the liberal economic model with inequality and corruption is insufficiently attractive to counteract for example jihadist messages.</li> <li>• Islamic fundamentalism, it is destabilizing and interfering with the economy, politics, and ethics of the transatlantic community.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Climate</b>   |   |
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dealing with climate change is an absolute existential priority for all nations as is dealing with the consequences of over-population, migration, natural disasters, and poverty.</li> </ul>  |

| Washington, DC, Leaders in Their Own Words  | Brussels Leaders in Their Own Words   |
|---|---|
| <b>Question: How do you think U.S. and European leaders should address this challenge?</b>  |   |
| <b>Cooperation</b>  |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There should be great cooperation. Greater efforts to understand one another including our legislators understanding their legislators.</li> <li>• They have to be ready to compromise, and rise above immediate, local, political pressures to reach a long-term solution that will help the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world.</li> <li>• More reliance on multilateral approaches to shared problems and a concerted effort to reduce divisions between institutional and noninstitutional Europe.</li> <li>• Take seriously greater U.S.-EU and NATO-EU cooperation.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By frankness and by visible commitment, leading the voters in shaping their opinion.</li> <li>• Increasing commitment to a joint EU-U.S. agenda on the basis of an equal relationship based on common values and interests.</li> <li>• By strengthening the dialogue at the highest level and agreeing on a coherent economic strategy, taking into account the specificities of the respective economies.</li> <li>• By speaking with a common voice to the other powers and by defining common rules for the economy respecting both the free market and the people (workers and citizens).</li> <li>• By robust economic partnership thorough institutions such as the G8 and by strengthening the role of NATO and discouraging autonomous tendencies by the United States or the EU.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Economy</b>  |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moving toward a more true free market economy.</li> <li>• Scrap the euro.</li> <li>• Retain some of the G7 (or G8) framework to allow for high-level economic conversations. Getting rid of the annual summit probably was a good idea, but leaders ... need to continue to meet and develop common positions for engaging the G20.</li> <li>• Both need to be looking hard at the current economic imbalances and problems and working to fix the problems, particularly with large financial interests, and get job-creation going, especially through new energy development.</li> <li>• Austerity.</li> <li>• Need consistent regulation in financial market.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tighter control on financial speculation, proper regulation of the market, recognizing that obtaining social justice is the key task of governments.</li> <li>• Financial motivation and equal balance in economic stability.</li> <li>• Free trade.</li> <li>• Stop political infighting and bureaucracy to make business flows across the Atlantic easier, sustainable, and profitable.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Governance</b>   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concerted and consistent effort worldwide, including addressing poverty, corruption, and governance in the third world.</li> <li>• Continued communication and negotiation within different international frameworks.</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Share power with emerging economies toward their becoming more responsible stakeholders in global governance.</li> <li>• They should create the space for real dialogue on challenging issues, giving citizens the opportunity to have input into government priorities, while guaranteeing a respect for human rights.</li> <li>• By developing a truly human rights-based approach to security issues and refrain from indulging in (a) populist policies that tend always to curtail the freedoms of minorities first and (b) giving too much uncontrolled power to all types of security.</li> </ul>   |
| <b>Development</b>  |   |
|   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be more serious about environmental issues. Make a real effort to stop the increase in world population. Attempt to build stronger links with moderate Muslims, to promote democracy, individual liberty, and tolerance.</li> </ul>  |



## TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS

### *Methodology*

The survey obtained a total of 519 interviews of transatlantic opinion leaders, 286 in Washington, DC, and 233 in Brussels. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International in the United States and by TNS Opinion in Europe. In both the United States and Europe, data were collected via telephone and via online administration. The fieldwork in the United States took place between June 17-September 13, 2010, and from June 21-October 1, 2010, in Europe. The results of this survey are compared to the findings of *Transatlantic Trends 2010*. *Transatlantic Trends* is a comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion. Polling was conducted by TNS Opinion between June 1 and June 29, 2010, in the United States and 12 European countries: Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, with a sample size of approximately 1,000 respondents per country. For results based on the national samples of the general public in each of the 13 countries surveyed, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of error attributable to sampling and other random effects is plus or minus three percentage points. For results based on the total European sample, the margin of error is plus or minus one percentage point. In addition to sampling

errors, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can also introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls. (More on the methodology of *Transatlantic Trends 2010* can be found at [www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org).)

The opinion leaders in this survey include political, administrative, social, and economic leaders. As for politicians, in the United States, senior-level Congressional staff and senior-level officeholders in the Executive Branch were interviewed, while in Europe members of the European parliament from Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and the United Kingdom, as well as high-level officials of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union were included in the sample. As for economic leaders, representatives of businesses and labor unions were interviewed. The sample also included journalists, key staff from nongovernmental groups such as think tanks, trade associations, and quasi-governmental organizations such as the World Bank.

Details on the design, execution and analysis of the survey are available for both the United States and EU at [www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org).

| <b>LEADERS</b> | <b>Congress/<br/>European<br/>Parliament</b> | <b>Exec.<br/>Branch/<br/>EU<br/>officials</b> | <b>Business<br/>and labor</b> | <b>Journalists</b> | <b>Think<br/>Thanks</b> | <b>Intl.<br/>Orgs</b> | <b>Nonprofit/<br/>Trade</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|----------------|--|---|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
| <b>U.S.</b>    | 66   | 67  | 52                            | 8                  | 35                      | 28                    | 30                          | 286          |
| <b>EU</b>      | 105  | 57  | 33                            | 7                  | 13                      | 5                     | 35                          | 233          |

### Final U.S. Sample Disposition Report by Segment

|                                | Congress | Exec. Branch | Business and Labor | Journalists | Think Tanks | Intl Orgs | Nonprofit/Trade | Overall |
|--------------------------------|----------|--------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------------|---------|
| <b>Sample Released</b>         | 687      | 366          | 229                | 34          | 75          | 69        | 69              | 1529    |
| <b>Bad Contact Information</b> | 33       | 44           | 16                 | 3           | 6           | 2         | 3               | 107     |
| <b>Callbacks</b>               | 120      | 92           | 47                 | 3           | 24          | 13        | 21              | 320     |
| <b>Other Noncontacts</b>       | 44       | 58           | 45                 | 8           | 4           | 15        | 3               | 177     |
| <b>Total Contacted</b>         | 490      | 172          | 121                | 20          | 41          | 39        | 42              | 925     |
| <b>Contact Rate</b>            | 71.3%    | 47.0%        | 52.8%              | 58.8%       | 54.7%       | 56.5%     | 60.9%           | 60.5%   |
| <b>Refusals</b>                | 424      | 105          | 69                 | 12          | 6           | 11        | 12              | 639     |
| <b>Total Cooperating</b>       | 66       | 67           | 52                 | 8           | 35          | 28        | 30              | 286     |
| <b>Cooperation Rate</b>        | 13.5%    | 39.0%        | 43.0%              | 40.0%       | 85.4%       | 71.8%     | 71.4%           | 30.9%   |
| <b>Response Rate</b>           | 9.6%     | 18.3%        | 22.7%              | 23.5%       | 46.7%       | 40.6%     | 43.5%           | 18.7%   |

### Final EU Sample Disposition Report by Segment

|                                | Congress | Exec. Branch | Business and Labor | Journalists | Think Tanks | Intl Orgs | Nonprofit/Trade | Overall |
|--------------------------------|----------|--------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------------|---------|
| <b>Sample Released</b>         | 415      | 509          | 247                | 173         | 132         | 78        | 771             | 2325    |
| <b>Bad Contact Information</b> | 0        | 17           | 21                 | 21          | 25          | 12        | 107             | 203     |
| <b>Total Contacted</b>         | 415      | 492          | 226                | 152         | 107         | 66        | 664             | 2122    |
| <b>Contact Rate</b>            | 100%     | 96.7%        | 91.5%              | 87.9%       | 81.1%       | 84.6%     | 86.1%           | 91.3%   |
| <b>Refusals</b>                | 310      | 435          | 200                | 145         | 94          | 61        | 629             | 1889    |
| <b>Total Cooperating</b>       | 105      | 57           | 11                 | 7           | 13          | 5         | 35              | 233     |
| <b>Cooperation Rate</b>        | 25.3%    | 11.6%        | 4.9%               | 4.6%        | 12.1%       | 7.6%      | 5.3%            | 11.0%   |
| <b>Response Rate</b>           | 25.3%    | 11.1%        | 4.4%               | 4.0%        | 9.8%        | 6.4%      | 4.5%            | 10.0%   |



**TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS**

[www.transatlantictrends.org](http://www.transatlantictrends.org)

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